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Beyond Hermeneutics: 
Peirce’s Semiology as a Trinitarian Metaphysics of
Communication
James Bradley
The semiology of Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914), the founder of
pragmatism, is a standing challenge as much to Gadamerian hermeneutics as to
Saussure’s structuralism and its deconstructionist progeny. Peirce’s semiology
constitutes a rejection of Saussure: because Saussure’s structuralism operates
only in terms of a binary or dyadic relation of signifier (words) and signified
(concepts), his account of communication is nominalist (concepts say nothing
about the world) and subjective-idealist (communication is a matter of linguistic
structures alone). Deconstruction takes this subjective idealism to its extreme
limit by treating communication as nothing more than the differential plurality of
signifiers–a paradoxical form of monism. Peirce’s semiology equally rejects the
hermeneutical restriction of communication to human interaction with the world;
even if Gadamer occasionally hints at a larger metaphysics,  he is unable to1
realize it on account of his subjective-idealist entanglements. Now Peirce is
indeed an idealist, but his is an ontological or objective idealism in the sense that
he sees the cosmos as an information exchange system, a communication system
that is constituted by the interpretation of signs.  For Peirce, physical matter itself2
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is one specific mode of the activity of semiosis or sign interpretation.  Briefly to3
indicate something of the power, originality and historical depth of this
extraordinary position, I will first of all outline what I take to be the central point
and purpose of Peirce’s general metaphysics, for that is in my view the context
in which his semiology, or any other aspect of his thinking, is always to be
understood. I will then go on to describe the basic features of his theory of signs.
Peirce’s Metaphysical Method
Peirce’s metaphysics is quite distinct from that of his continental counterparts in
that it is elaborated in close relation to modern developments in mathematics and
the logic of relations (to both of which he made signal contributions), and it is
marked by an insistence on the intelligibility of things. He sees himself as the
inheritor of the metaphysical tradition (he was an expert in medieval philosophy)
and as bringing about a renaissance of metaphysics: his work has the empiricist
intent of rescuing rationality from the absolute necessities of Mind or pure
Reason, characteristic of the European rationalism and idealism, and the
rationalist intent of restoring intelligible order to those structures of experience
which both rationalists and empiricists alike have often consigned to the realm of
the non-rational, typically under the rubrics of “ineffability,” “feeling,” or
“action.”
Peirce’s metaphysical method is oriented, not to the traditional
understanding of mathematics as based on self-evidently true axioms, but to the
postulatory procedures of modern mathematics and the experimentalism of
natural science. In this context, his metaphysics is based, like any inquiry, on faith
(Latin, fides: trust) in the hypothesis of reason. This hypothesis is for Peirce
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articulated by the principle of reason, the principle that “Nothing is without a
reason,” or “Everything that is the case must have a reason why it is the case.”4
Negatively, the principle of reason requires the rejection of the
no-hypothesis hypothesis: “the hypothesis that no hypothesis is possible,” as
Peirce puts it.  For the principle of reason rejects the essentially sceptical theory5
or hypothesis that there are things which no theory or hypothesis can explain. It
rejects the hypothesis that there is anything that is ultimately inexplicable in the
sense that there is anything about which no explanatory theory can be sought and
entertained.
Positively, the principle of reason requires unrestricted commitment to
the search for explanation. No appeal is made here to an a priori rule. We have
only the experimental or hypothetical application of the principle of reason to the
fact that we live in a puzzling world. Further, the principle of reason requires that
we go beyond even the most basic laws and operations of logic, mathematics and
physics, for these do not account, nor do they attempt to account, for why there
are laws or operations at all. Unrestrictedly applied, the principle of reason
requires that we look for an ultimate that is self-justifying or self-explanatory. 
Peirce’s metaphysics is thus a “speculative” metaphysics in the sense that
it is a theory of the actualization of the empirical world, a theory of the activity
of actualization. Moreover, such a metaphysics would have to meet the stringent
requirement that whatever is held to be the ultimate or self-explanatory principle
of actualization must possess in its own nature, or provide out of its own nature,
all the reasons needed to explain its existence or activity.
Self-explanatoriness is not of course the same as proof. Indeed, the
question as to what constitutes an adequate self-explanatory theory of the activity
of actualization is hotly debated between the different speculative schools that
seek the self-explanatory. For brevity, I shall call them speculative
‘explanatorists,’ in contrast to speculative ‘descriptivists’ like, say, Schopenhauer,
Nietzsche, Bergson or Deleuze, who take the principle of reason far enough to
offer anti-empiricist theories of the activity of actualization, but refuse to press
it any further and so abandon the concern with the self-explanatory. In the
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‘explanatorist’ tradition from Plato on, the principle of reason generally operates
in the way that Peirce is the first to define as ‘abduction.’ In his words: “The
surprising fact C is observed/But if A were true, C would be a matter of
course/Hence, there is reason to suppose that A is true.”  The argument is not a6
deduction, since it does not claim that its conclusion must be true if its premises
are true. It is not inductive, since the statement referred to in the conclusion is not
tested by sampling. Whereas induction tells us that a statement, true in some
cases, is likely to be true in unobserved cases, abduction allows us to conclude to
the likelihood of something unlike anything that is observed. It is inference to the
best possible explanation. The procedure is fallibilist: repeated application of
abductive inference may lead to continued revision of our hypothesis in the light
of new observations, as has always been the case with explanatorist theories of
actualization. And the hypothesis is not just tested against experience. Experience
is tested against the hypothesis, which has the status of a critical principle: do the
putative observations, or our descriptions of the observed, display the characters
posited by the hypothesis? Ostensive demonstration cuts both ways. Or, more
precisely, it moves in a virtuous circle.
There are two further hypotheses that are basic to Peirce’s metaphysics.
There is the hypothesis of reality: namely, that reality is that which has a nature
of its own, in the sense that it is so independently of our minds or independently
of whether or not we think it to be so. There is also the hypothesis of
universalism, or the reality of universals. The hypotheses of reason, reality and
universalism are taken up, elaborated and defended by Peirce by way of his
speculative metaphysics of actualization.
The Metaphysics of Triunity
Speculative theories of the principle of actualization, whether explanatorist or
descriptivist, come in five different forms. A principle of actualization could be
monadic, as is Nietzsche’s theory of the Will to Power, or, most obviously, the
Judaic and Islamic account of the creator God as an absolutely unique, singular
being whose nature is defined as completely transcending human powers of
reason. 
A principle of actualization could be binary or dyadic, as when the
foundations of the cosmos are held by Empedocles to be the twin principles of
love and strife, by Democritus to be atoms and the void, by Schopenhauer to be
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will and idea, by Samuel Alexander to be space and time, or by Alain Badiou to
be being and event. A principle of actualization could be triadic, as is Plotinus’s
hierarchy of the One, Mind, and Soul, Spinoza’s hierarchy of Substance,
Attributes, and Modes, and Deleuze’s non-hierarchical threefold of Difference (or
Event, or Being ), virtualities, and specific differences or events. A principle of7
actualization could be tetradic, as in Plato’s Timaeus with its fourfold of the
Good, the God, Form, and Matter, or in Whitehead’s “categorial scheme” of
creativity, God, eternal objects and actual occasions.
There can be no question, however, that the tradition which dominates the
history of Western speculative thought is that which holds the principle of
actualization to be a triunity of three distinct, irreducible, but inseparable and
coequal elements. Most would acknowledge that this tradition stretches from
Plato’s syntrisi or three-in-one,  through the medieval period, to the idealism of8
Hegel and Schelling. It is not so often noticed, however, that it has been a
significant feature of modern philosophy over the last one hundred and fifty years.
I refer primarily to Peirce’s ontology of “firstness,” “secondness” and “thirdness,”
but there is also the later Heidegger’s das Ereignis (“the Event”), with its triunity
of Es gibt (“It gives”), die Sendung (“the sending”), and die Gabe (“the gift”), as
well as Collingwood’s treatment of the Trinity as the fundamental “absolute
presupposition” of natural science.9
Two comments may help to dispel any puzzlement there may be at the
persistence of the notion of triunity as a theory of the activity of actualization.
First, because the triune theories mentioned are explanatorist, they are elaborated
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so as to address three basic questions. These are the questions of the nature of
origin, difference and order. For in the first place an explanatorist theory of the
activity of actualization requires a theory of the origin of difference and order.
That is, it requires an account of that activity which is in some sense prior to
difference and order because it is the condition of difference and order. In the
second place, an explanatorist theory requires an account of the actualization of
difference or individuality, of the nature of differentiation. And in the third place,
such a theory requires an account of the actualization of order. The primacy
attached to these issues is of course characteristic of the triune tradition itself. But
they have a certain obviousness about them that helps to indicate the rationale of
the general position.
Secondly, there is a set of considerations connected with the development of
mathematics and the rise of natural science. In the medieval period, the doctrine
of the triune God, with its theory of the “persons” of Father, Son, and Spirit, is
expounded as a supernatural or revealed mystery of faith. This is not to deny that
the triune God is employed to provide a self-explanatory account of the activity
of actualization. In Aquinas, for example, all things have their esse, or act of
being, which is given by the Father; their individual nature (species), which is
given by the Son or Logos; and their relation to other things which is given by the
Spirit, the principle or gift of love or community.  Nevertheless, the concept of10
an essentially relational being cuts across the Aristotelian view that finite
substances exist independently and that relations are accidents. Hence it is
difficult in the context of Aristotelian metaphysics to develop a trinitarian account
of all the features of the created world. By contrast, once mathematics and natural
science had established the intrinsic relationality of the natural world,  the11
relational model could unproblematically be transposed, under the rubric of
triunity, not only to the analysis of the constitution of the finite subject (as with
Kant’s plethora of triunities ), but also to the whole of reality, defined as an12
absolute subject with three essential modes or functional operations (Hegel and
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Schelling ). As Collingwood puts it: “The doctrine of the Trinity, taught as a13
revelation by early Christianity … becomes in Kant and his successors a
demonstrable and almost alarmingly fertile logical principle.”  In a relational14
world, there is no longer anything unintelligible about the triune principle, which
thus becomes an immanent ground of actualization, even though it is still
apprehended as complete and all-containing (Hegel) or as resolving its own nature
independently of its creation (Schelling). I now turn to the sea-change that Peirce
brings about in the theory of triunity, transforming the medieval theory of persons
and the German Idealist theory of the absolute subject into a radically immanent
logic of events.15
Peirce’s Metaphysics of Triunity
Peirce’s Trinitarianism is a natural theology, or, more precisely, an
empiricist-oriented metaphysics, of the Trinity: it attempts to make manifest the
necessarily creative and radically immanent triune principle of actualization
across the fields of logic, mathematics, phenomenology, semiotics and speculative
cosmology. Although there is no space to elaborate this large claim here, I will
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say something about how I interpret each principle of his triunity, drawing
specifically on his cosmology, and I will try to indicate as I proceed something of
its significance as an event ontology. Throughout, it is important to keep in mind
that for Peirce any identifiable entity whatsoever is to be analyzed in terms of his
triune principle of actualization, which is distinct but inseparable from that which
it actualizes or creates. This means, as will become evident, that any identifiable
entity has the nature of a triune event in the infinitely or inexhaustibly proceeding
movement of actualization.
In the first place, the self-explanatory first principle of actualization, which
Peirce calls “firstness,” is pure ecstatic or ablative activity, abductive “movement
from …” Because it is origin, it is unconditioned. So it is free or spontaneous in
the sense that it acts wholly out of its own nature. Because it is unconditioned or
free activity, it is limitless in the sense that it is absolutely indeterminate in its
own nature. It is a free ekstasis which, as such, possesses no ‘real’ or determining
properties or predicates. Its character as free ecstatic activity means that in the
nature of the case it is a non-determining power.
This concept of origin follows both Marius Victorinus and the Franciscan
voluntarists in making being or activity (esse, actus essendi) prior to mind, and
it owes a great deal to Schelling’s theory of Abgrund. However, Peirce abandons
the psychological notion of will, characteristic of voluntarism, as well as the
Gnostic and mystical elements in Schelling. Instead, he elaborates the concept of
origin in terms of a particular kind of mathematical infinite. His is not the
potential infinite of Aristotle and the intuitionists, where however many parts it
is divided into, it is possible for there to be more. Nor is it the real categorematic
infinite of set theory, involving an infinite multiplicity of sets in which the parts
or components are really there and their number is greater than any given. Rather,
Peirce’s firstness is a particular kind of syncategorematic infinite. That is, his
primordial infinite is real in that it is inexhaustible activity, and it is potential in
that its absolute indeterminacy means “it contains no definite parts;”  it is a16
continuum of potential parts only.  Peirce’s infinite is a syncategorematic infinite17
of real or dynamical potentiality.
One main feature of this theory of infinity is that here we have a concept of
origin which in the nature of the case is not a One, not an All, not a Totality, not
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even a multiplicity of any kind. As Peirce stresses, this is a mathematical concept
of pure chance.18
Peirce describes free or indeterminate firstness as a no-thing or void.  That19
is, firstness is nothing, not as all-containing plenitude (per excellentiam nihil), nor
as vacuity (omnino nihil), nor as negation (nihil privativum), but only as infinite
free indeterminacy (nihil per infinitatem).  It may be objected that this infinite20
origin is a ‘unity’ of free indeterminacy. However, as will be more fully explained
in a moment, unity is in Peirce an effect, not a property of the origin; in Peirce,
unity emerges out of the triune relation as its realization. The sole kind of unity
that the first considered in its own nature possesses is the unity of irreducibility
(unum), for the first is the principium non de principio and as such is
unconditioned freedom. Peirce’s firstness is not a unicity in any other sense;
rather, it is the univocal concept of a dynamical free indeterminacy that as such
has no nature of its own, and, in communicating itself to all things, is necessarily
never the same.
This brings us to Peirce’s principle of “secondness.” Because the first
principle is ecstatic, self-realizing movement, it gives rise out of itself to a second
activity or principle of actualization: the principle of essentially and
spontaneously self-differentiating activity, of dative “movement to …” The
distinctness and irreducibility of this second principle resides in the fact that it is
not in its own nature indeterminate activity but is the activity of determination:
it constitutes differences or individuals, haecceities, and it does so by
communicating to them the irreducible spontaneity that is the positive basis of all
determinacy or actuality. Such differentiating activity is also the positive basis of
the logical laws of non-contradiction, negation and the excluded middle. Because
everything is itself and not another thing, a key phenomenological character of
individuals for Peirce is reaction or resistance to that which is different.
There cannot, however, be any such thing as pure differences, for all
difference (aliquid) involves not just irreducibility (unum) but difference of
character or behaviour (res), however minimal. It follows that, for ecstatic activity
to realize its differentiations as such–and so to realize itself in relation to its
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differentiations–it articulates its communicative nature as a law or rule of relation
for itself and for its differentiations. That is, because ekstasis is essentially
communicative and self-realizing, it determines itself as a law or rule and
communicates that power to its differentiations as their medium. Such power is
the potentiality of order, and it is by way of the medium of order that differences
are constituted. The distinctness and irreducibility of this third element resides in
the fact that it is the activity of ordination, the actualizing principle of order or
structure.
Peirce’s “thirdness” or power of mediation defines the implications of his
theory of origin for specific laws or rules. Like differences, all structures are
determinations of free indeterminacy, which is inexhaustible. In consequence, all
structures carry free indeterminacy within their nature. So all structures possess
an inexhaustible indeterminacy, which is always more than any of their individual
instances. What this means is that all specific laws or rules are essentially and
intrinsically vague: they are infinitely or inexhaustibly determinable
determinations. Thus there are no really complete or completable wholes; as
Peirce insists,  for any given whole or continuity (e.g. “All men are mortal”), the21
universal quantifier is to be interpreted distributively (“For each …”) not
collectively (“For all …”). Wholes are infinite in the distributive, not the
collective, mode; and they are distributive wholes because they are intrinsically
vague or infinitely indeterminate. 
What we have in this mathesis universalis is one of the great revolutions in
the theory of universals. Forms do not constitute an infinite multiplicity of fixed
entities; rather, they are potentials that are subject to evolution, to development
and decay. This is an explanatorist theory of the activity of actualization in which
there is no complete, all-containing Totality or One. Unity–and with it the unity
of truth–is an effect, not an origin. All achieved unities–including that of the
triune principle of actualization itself–are dynamical events of spontaneity,
difference, and order, which as such are essentially incomplete and open to
further determination. For Peirce, there are no absolute individuals, for all entities
are infinitely determinable determinations.
Peirce’s Semiology
It is evident that in Peirce being or activity is not primarily analyzed as substance
or subjectivity but as communication, the self-communication of the triune
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principle. Because what the triune principle communicates is itself, it
communicates communicativity, and on a Peircean analysis communicativity is,
in the nature of the case, triune in nature. We are here at the core of Peirce’s
semiology, the whole point and purpose of which is to make manifest the role of
the Trinity in the actualization of the real.  Indeed, it will become evident that his22
semiology is an evidential or phenomenological argument for the triune theory of
evolutionary actualization. There is no appeal to ‘hidden’ causes here, only the
task of ostensive demonstration, the task of bringing to light that which is most
evident, most obvious and familiar, that which is so close to us we can miss it on
account of its universal presence.
Within the fundamental speculative triunity of activity, difference and order,
or firstness, secondness and thirdness, semiology is an analysis of order or
thirdness. Before turning to this analysis, however, it is helpful to place it in a
larger context by noting that, following Victorinus, Peirce views each of the
members of his speculative threefold as themselves threefolds, on account of their
intrinsically co-relational nature.  Thus Peirce has three types of firstness:23
firstness itself (which is pure spontaneity), the firstness of secondness (which is
difference, individuality or existence, ex-sistere, to stand outside, a term coined
by Victorinus to describe the members of the Trinity) and the firstness of
thirdness (which is idea). Secondness is analyzed as existence, as cause, and as
effect. Thirdness is analyzed as idea or sign, as the exchange of information
between individual entities, and as interpretation; in other words, thirdness is
itself a threefold of sign, object and interpretant. Here, sign occupies the position
of firstness because it is the potentiality for interpretation; object occupies that of
secondness because it is determinate; and the interpretant occupies that of
thirdness because the interpretant has the sign-interpreting or sign-ordering role,
and so has the status of a third.  Thus for Peirce semiology is the analysis of the24
triune relation of sign, object and interpretant. This will be further explained as
we proceed. I will begin by giving an initial definition of the three semiological
elements, presenting them in an order I find convenient.
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The Semiological Threefold
Peirce says: “A sign is a representamen with a mental intepretant.”  To use his25
example, the sunflower is a representamen or medium of the sun for its offspring.
Its offspring is its interpretant. There is no mental representation here, but a serial
information exchange or semiological event in which one entity (the sunflower)
is a sign of an object (the sun) to another (the seed).
The sign stands in relation to an object. The object need not, however, be a
cognized object: think of the sun as object in relation to the sunflower as sign.
The object is the independent factor in semiological process, the factor that guides
and constrains both sign and interpretant. Here, Peirce distinguishes between the
“immediate” and the “dynamical” object. The immediate object is the individual
object as it appears in a specific interpretive process. The dynamical object is the
potentialities that an individual object has beyond any specific interpretive
process.
Signs constrain and guide the interpretant. That is, they contain their own
developmental conditions that contribute to semiological events consequent upon
them. Signs are intrinsically vague and hence can evolve in the semiological
process. What kind of process this is I will state in a moment.
Peirce uses the term “interpretant” rather than “interpretation” to get away
from any cognitive connotations. Interpretants need not be existent minds, mental
acts, cognitive entities, or even ‘experiencing’ entities of any kind.  It is not even26
necessary that an interpretant should actually exist: a being in futuro will
suffice.  Whether an object has been interpreted is to be decided not by27
inspecting the contents of a mind or an experience but by seeing what behaviour
follows from the contact in question.
The semiological threefold of sign, object, and interpretant constitutes an
endless, infinitely proliferating, iterative semiotic series. The sign is what the
object becomes for an interpretant, the interpretant is what the sign becomes, and
in turn that interpretant becomes an object for a successor interpretant. Peirce’s
semiology is thus a theory of active causation that rejects regularity and
entailment theories: signs, objects and interpretants are each agent-causes that
have their own spontaneity, and they are genuinely efficacious in that they are
active in the production or determination of their effects. The semiological
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movement of actualization–the immanence of the threefold principle of
actualization in all things–is through and through a theory of evolutionary
process.
Relations and Applications of the Semiological Threefold
Peirce analyses the relations of the three semiological elements in terms of their
inseparability and co-relationality. Given the general principle of Peirce’s
Trinitarian metaphysics that any identifiable entity is analysable as a threefold,
it is no surprise that he defines the nature of signs accordingly. Here, I will simply
state his basic, interdependent, trichotomous sign-schema and indicate the
meaning of his technical terms:
Sign as object: qualisign (quality, intensity); sinsign (individual event/object,
“replica” or token); legisign (general type). Note that no one element in this
trichotomy can be what it is without the others.
Sign in relation to object: icon (similarity); index (causal relation); symbol
(rule, natural or convention). Note that this second trichotomy has as it condition
the first trichotomy.
Sign in relation to interpretant: rheme (predicate, possibility); dicisign
(propositions, facts); argument (law for interpretant). This trichotomy is an
analysis of the way icons, indices and symbols function for an interpretant.
A further feature of the intrinsic co-relationality characteristic of Peirce’s sign
analysis is that each member of his semiological threefold mediates the others.
First, there is the mediatory role of the sign: the sign mediates object and
interpretant. The object is the antecedent, the interpretant the consequence of the
sign. For example: ‘President Lincoln’ as object; ‘liberator’ as sign; ‘President
Lincoln as liberator’ is interpretant.  Secondly, there is the mediating role of the28
object, where the object mediates between sign and interpretant in that it
constrains and guides both. Thirdly, the interpretant mediates sign and object.
That is, it links them in the thought ‘President Lincoln as liberator.’ Note here,
however, that in the infinite proliferation of the semiotic series the intepretant
itself can become a sign mediating the object, President Lincoln, to a further
interpretant, such as Lincoln’s statue in Washington D. C. Again, what in our
example was the object, President Lincoln, can become the sign which interprets
an object, liberator. For Pierce, any referent of the semiological threefold can
switch its roles, depending on its position in a specific semiological process 
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Let me summarize this last point with some basic applications or examples,
in order to bring out the extraordinary flexibility of Peirce’s conception of the
threefold semiological process. The relation of object and interpretant is the sign;
e.g., the text of King Lear as object; audience as interpretant; performance as
sign. The sign is what the object becomes in interpretation and each interpretation
is an event of truth. The relation is serial: the sign itself becomes another object
for a subsequent interpretant. Moreover, any referent, because of its intrinsically
threefold nature, can be analyzed trivalently. For example, each element equally
applies to the division of artist, artwork, and audience, for each of the latter can
be treated as sign, object, or interpretant, depending on the context or perspective.
Again, we can treat experience as object, artwork as sign, and artist or audience
as interpretants. With respect to the artist or audience, it is noteworthy that the
notion of the interpretant implies a semiological theory of the self as a continuous,
unified series of self-interpreting events; something more than a Humean bundle
and other than a fixed, enduringly identical substance.  Above all, no one29
element in the triunity of object, interpretant, sign can be prioritized over another.
So there is space in this analysis for the critical freedom of the interpretant; the
sign is defined neither as a differential engine, nor as a destined unfolding of
Being, that operates over the heads of subjects. Thus Peirce can say: “The word
or sign which man uses is the man himself … Thus my language is the sum total
of myself.”  Or more graphically: “A mind may, with advantage, be roughly30
defined as a sign-creator in connection with a reaction-machine.”  Meaning is31
use, but it is the use of signs. This is a realist and social practice theory of
meaning that never allows the ethical surrender of the individual interpretant. 
Semiology and Teleology
To get a better grip on Peirce’s theory of semiological process, we need to ask:
what kind of active order is posited here?
The first thing to notice is that semiological order or a semiological event is
intrinsically triune order. This means it cannot be defined as an order of two
dyads: A : B and B : C. Smoke is a sign of fire, but not without an intepretant.
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There are only signs where there are objects and interpretants; that is, all
semiological relations are relations that are directed to an intepretant. Hence all
semiological relations are essentially teleological. 
Teleology is activity, the goal or end of which is the realization or
actualization of something. There are three types of teleology that Peirce
distinguishes, and all are present to some degree in any semiological event.  This32
analysis cannot, I believe, be ignored in any account of Peirce’s semiology.
First, there is random teleology, where the interpretant spontaneously departs
from the direction indicated by the sign or rule. Such departures are usually
completely insignificant, though universal. They are purposeless, playful, and
unconstrained either by external circumstance or by any internal logical
consequences. The activity of actualization involved here is teleological in that
it is self-realizing activity, free self-determination unconstrained by circumstance
or rule. It is the teleology of play, purposiveness without (specific) purpose. So
this is one type of purposeless teleology which arises from the presence in the
realm of order of the ecstatic activity that is firstness or spontaneity.
Secondly, there is another type of purposeless teleology. This is mechanical
teleology. Here the end is given and predetermined. External and logical
conditions largely determine the outcome that is realized. The sunflower seed is
a good example (always remembering that each sunflower seed is an individual
or a centre of spontaneity, and so an active, if infinitesimal, departure from the
general law). This type of purposeless teleology arises from the differential power
of order in respect of individuals.
Thirdly, there is purposive teleology. Here the end is not predetermined and
the outcome is not more or less exhaustively determined by external or logical
conditions. There is no pre-given result: the sign or rule only vaguely determines
or mediates the general character of the outcome. So within specific constraints
the result is freely determined by the synthetic, organizing activity of the
intepretant, which is always as inclusive or self-expansive as it can be. The
semiological process here is purposive in that it is self-directed by the interpretant
and is directed toward the interpretant. The interpretant, or the realization of the
interpretant, is the object or end of its own activity. A good example might be the
vagueness or indeterminate potentialities of a human personality. 
On this account, given the universality of the semiological phenomenon,
reality itself is essentially vague or incomplete. More precisely: the logical laws
of non-contradiction and the excluded middle, as well as the semantic principle
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of bivalence, are inapplicable or irrelevant to the domain of the first principle of
the threefold but hold in that of the second principle, which is their actualizing
condition. Such rules, that is, are not universal, as on the standard interpretation,
but necessary features of individuality and its semantics. It follows that in respect
of rules or generals, of which the third principle is the actualizing condition, the
law of non-contradiction holds of them, but the law of excluded middle and the
principle of bivalence do not. 
For Peirce, therefore, vagueness is an ontological condition of all things,
which means that in thinking we enjoy a relatively precise grasp of vague content.
To put it another way: the incompleteness and indeterminacy of any identifiable
entity, its infinite potentiality, entails the vagueness of all specific content.
Looked at in a historical perspective, Peirce is here appropriating Scotus’s
theory of the “imperfection” of metaphysical concepts and Kant’s notion of the
indeterminacy of regulative ideas. He transforms them into a realist theory of
“vague” universals, or what he likes to call “generals.” In this way he dissolves
the Scotist opposition of logic and metaphysics. Further, he overcomes the
Kantian tension between mechanism and teleology by holding them to be (as
noted above) experienced and essentially interdependent modes of the realm of
thirdness or ordination. Given Peirce’s strong realism in respect of universals, it
is no surprise he regards Kant as a nominalist in that (1) Kant treats rules, unlike
particulars, as purely constructs of the mind and so gives primacy to particulars;
and (2) Kant assumes that the law of excluded middle applies universally to the
real, with the result that the indeterminate has a lesser status; hence (3) Kant
problematically treats the noumenal realm of the Ding an sich as a realm of
determinate individual entities that are nevertheless held to be unknowable. It is
thus to be expected that subjective idealism holds no terrors for Peirce:
“experience” is not a restrictive limit, but essentially and dynamically relational.
In this context, the crucial implication of Peirce’s theories of infinity and
vagueness should now be clear: there is no opposition between realism and
constructivism, for the real is itself a movement of constructive activity. This is
a theory of evolutionary process in which the cosmos is understood as a sign that
awaits its realization as a community by the activity of interpretation. The
ultimate telos is not the all-containing self-completeness of transparent mind, but
the mutuality of shared and perfect community.
A Final Question
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In conclusion, given current attitudes, it is necessary to ask whether or not
Peirce’s semiology can be divorced from its speculative-metaphysical context of
Trinitarianism. In one sense, this is obviously so: the triune semiological process
can be treated as a naturalist cosmology of communication, or merely as a useful
interpretive tool. Yet these are dodges: they simply avoid carrying out the kind of
metaphysical analysis that the theory of infinity, which underpins the semiology,
requires. The same is true of any attempt idealistically to delimit semiology as the
interpretive structure of the human sciences and to ‘universalize’ it on that basis,
tacitly acquiescing in the no-hypothesis hypothesis. To do that, after Peirce, is
merely to lapse back into hermeneutics. 
